Who Really Controls Access to Independent Eyewear in Europe?  —Episode 1

Perhaps the most important question concerns the independent opticians themselves.

Could opticians be manipulated by sales agents? Do they truly have access to a diverse ecosystem of emerging brands or does most of what reaches them first pass through the same filtering networks of agents?

In licensed luxury eyewear, consumers feel they are choosing from hundreds of brands. In reality, most of those labels are controlled by just four global corporations.

The independent sector has long been presented as the alternative: new designers, creative brands and open access to the market. But what happens if access here is also filtered not by corporations, but by sales agents?

We began this investigation by mapping the brand portfolios of more than 1,600 independent optical stores across the European Union using a proprietary software platform currently under testing.

The result was unexpected.

92.5 percent of the independent brands present in those stores are represented by the same interconnected networks of agents, who know each other and operate within the same commercial circles.

Is this simply a coincidence of market structure, or could it raise questions under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits agreements that restrict competition?

If access to independent brands passes through such a limited number of intermediaries, are agents still simply commercial representatives or have they become gatekeepers of the market?

In licensed eyewear owned by large corporations, competition follows a clear structure. Each company operates its own sales teams, internal distribution channels and brand ambassadors.

Independent eyewear operates differently. Most emerging brands cannot afford dedicated sales teams and instead rely on external agents to access retail.

But what happens when those same agents represent multiple brands while simultaneously controlling which retailers are introduced to them?

Have some intermediaries moved beyond representation and begun shaping which brands are able to enter the market at all?

Several new brands told us they were unable to generate sales after agents informed them that “the market was not ready” or that “there was no demand” for their product.

However, our research suggests a different picture.

In many of those cases, the majority of optical stores within the territory had never even been contacted by the agents responsible for representing the brand or, if they were contacted, the brand in question was not presented.

Is this simply inefficient distribution or could it resemble market foreclosure, a concept examined under the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) governing vertical agreements within the European Union?

Across multiple territories we also observed the presence of exclusive representation agreements, sometimes covering entire markets while showing limited commercial activity.

Why are certain territories contractually locked while development remains minimal?

Could such arrangements fall within the scope of VBER rules governing exclusive distribution and vertical restrictions?

And if a small group of intermediaries ultimately controls access to thousands of independent optical retailers, could questions also arise under Article 102 TFEU, which addresses the potential abuse of dominant market positions? Has this simply gone uninvestigated until now because, at first glance, the market appeared fragmented and small in scale, with participants operating under different entities?

Are these networks simply part of the normal commercial structure of the industry or could they be coordinating in ways that test the boundaries of European competition law?

Do opticians always realize how distribution decisions are made?

Could unsold inventory in optical stores sometimes be linked to aggressive sales strategies by intermediaries who increasingly present themselves as “consultants”?

And when a single agent represents multiple brands competing within the same category, does this raise questions under EU competition principles ?

These are the questions that will guide this investigation.

Because in an industry built on the idea of choice, the most important question may be the simplest one:

Who actually decides which brands get to be seen ?

Could some new brands be sabotaged when attempting to enter the market misled by the agents with whom they signed representation agreements, financially weakened by time spent in contracts that generate no sales, and ultimately pushed out, potentially protecting other brands within the same agents’ portfolios from competition?